This paper assesses the empirical evidence bearing on three questions that have fueled contemporary debates about the economic consequences of immigration: (1) What impact do immigrants have on the U.S. labor market? 
Introduction
History repeats itself. The familiar ring of these opening quotes conveys past concerns about immigration. The prospect of a better life in the United States continues to draw large numbers of immigrants to our shores. And as the volume and composition of recent immigrant flows change, the Congress, the academic community, and the public are re-assessing whether the costs of immigration outweigh the benefits. Contemporary concerns hinge on labor market? and (3) How much do immigrants cost the U.S. taxpayers? Our emphasis on economic considerations is not intended to underplay the importance of social and political issues. Rather, space constraints compel us to address a single set of problems. Our focus on labor market and welfare issues reflects their prominence in the contemporary debate.
U.S. Immigration in Historical Perspective
Two distinguishing features of post-World War I1 immigration are increasing volume and diversity. Recent inflows, however, are not historically unprecedented. Table 1 This is relatively low compared to earlier periods, as Table 1 demonstrates.
Over the last three decades immigration has contributed a growing share of net Another school of thought argues that the entry of foreign workers into the labor market does not result in significant displacement because immigrants "take a distinct set of jobs, jobs that the native labor force refuses to accept. ,.I9 The operational assumption in this position is that the American labor market is segmented such that "good" jobs can be clearly Conversely, foreign and native workers may be complements in production, that is, they perform complementary, but interdependent, jobs and have complementary skills. As the supply of immigrants rises, native workers can gain by specializing in those industries and occupations in which they have a comparative advantage. As a result, their wages (and employment levels) rise.
The empirical question of whether immigrants and native workers are substitutes or complements in production is fundamental for ascertaining the labor market consequences of immigration. A number of recent studies (see Table 2 ) provide some empirical evidence on the nature of this relationship. 23 The methodology in these studies involves a comparison of the earnings of native workers across labor markets. If the two types of labor are substitutes (complements), economic theory predicts that the earnings of native workers would be lower (higher) in those labor markets in which the supply of immigrants is relatively high, holding constant other variables that determine worker productivity and wage levels.
The growing consensus in these studies is that the native labor force as a whole and foreign workers are substitutes in production, but that the correlation is weak. That is, an increase in the size of the immigrant work force lowers the wage rate of native workers, but only by a small amount.
Available estimates suggest, for example, that a 10 percent increase in the number of immigrants reduces the native wage rate by at most two-tenths of one percentage point. These studies also suggest that when the native labor force is disaggregated by race the same weak correlations tend to recur. In fact the degree of substitution between foreign and native workers appears to be stronger for white than for black workers. The one group of workers who are strongly and negatively affected by an increased supply of new immigrants is the stock of foreign workers already in the United States. Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the number of new immigrants reduces the average wage of resident foreign workers by 2 to 9 percent.
Available evidence, therefore, is inconsistent with claims that immigrants impose a major cost on the United States because they reduce the earnings and employment opportunities of native workers. There are, however, three 
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By way of explaining these results, researchers argued that because recent immigrants lacked a variety of skills valued by U.S. employers, they were motivated to recover migration costs partly through intensive training or human capital investments (e.g., learning a new language), thereby acquiring the needed skills. The initial lack and subsequent acquisition of this human capital presumably explained why immigrant earnings were relatively low upon arrival and subsequently grew faster than those of comparable native workers.
This interpretation fails to explain why, in the long run, immigrant earnings surpass those of similar native workers. To address the anomaly of immigrant earnings "overtaking" the earnings of native workers, several researchers argued (but did not demonstrate) that immigrants are a select group of individuals who on average, are **more able and more highly motivatedw2' than the native U.S. population. In other words immigrants were assumed to be a nonrandom, positively selected sample of their respective origin countries.
This interpretation did not, however, indicate why the earnings of some immigrant groups rose faster than others, except to suggest that discrimination might be involved.
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Three inferences were drawn from these cross-sectional studies of immigrant earnings. First, assimilation was an inevitable aspect of the immigration process, and its outcomes were uniformly favorable, if somewhat uneven among groups. Second, the assimilation process occurred in such a relatively short period of time that gains for the receiving communities could be considerable. Third, the relatively low economic status of recent immigrants provides no basis for concern, since their earnings inevitably would rise as they gained experience relevant to the U.S. market.
There is, however, a serious logical flaw in these inferences made from cross-section studies. A single cross-section of data cannot separate aging (or assimilation) and cohort effects. 31 The fact that immigrant earnings and length of U.S. residence are strongly and positively correlated may result either from assimilation or a cohort effect, or both. The cohort effect captures earnings differences between immigrant waves, which may reflect differences in the skills of the cohorts.
Two empirically important factors can generate sizable skill differentials across immigrant cohorts. The first is selective return migration, whereby as many as 3 0 percent of a specific immigrant cohort return to the country of origin within ten years. 32 Since emigration propensities are nonrandomly distributed, immigrants from early waves surviving to the observation date (e.g., the Census week) represent a nonrandom sample of the original cohort.
If, for example, persons who "fail" in the U. S . labor market return to their countries of origin, earlier waves will overrepresent successful immigrants, and comparisons to the more recent immigrants (who presumably form a more representative sample) lead researchers to conclude that immigrant earnings grow as U.S. labor market experience is accurrmlated even if no assimilation effect truly exists.
Second, changes in immigration policy and in economic and political conditions in the sending countries may have led to a shift in immigration toward less-skilled workers. These findings thus raise a substantive policy problem: the major changes in immigration policy (as well as the recurring political and economic crises in sending countries) have generated an inflow of immigrants into the United
States who seem to fare less well relative to the native workers. In addition, the empirical evidence shows that assimilation rates (in terms of earnings growth as U.S. labor market experience is accumulated) for recent immigrants are smaller than previously assumed. Thus, the potential exists for the creation of a permanent class of low-income immigrants, with little prospect of becoming fully integrated into the U.S. labor market or society.
True, low-income immigrants may be preferred workers in some sectors of the U.S. economy precisely because they are unskilled: the use of immigrant labor in U.S. agriculture is a case in point. But concerns about the tax burdens imposed by immigrants challenge the view that immigrants of any class or national origin are preferred to native workers.
The Impact of Immigrants on Social Expenditures
As in the past, looming large in the recent policy debates is the question of whether immigrants become public dependents. On this topic only spotty empirical analysis exists. The few studies, while diverse in their methodologies, data, and subgroup comparisons (see Table 4 , 40 concur that immigrants are less likely to use transfer payments than are (statistically) similar native persons, and that the likelihood of receipt of welfare income is lower for recent immigrants than it is for earlier arrivals. This generalization is critical, because it is at variance with public perception of the problem.
Assessments of immigrants' propensity to use transfer income relative to natives with similar characteristics has involved descriptive tabular analyses of survey data and the estimation of statistical models using census-type micro-data. These models express the probability of receipt of public assistance income (or social security income), as a function of individual, household, and locational variables which govern economic need and eligibility for receipt of transfers. Since immigrants are more likely to have incomes below the poverty line, 41 a higher proportion are eligible for public assistance. Thus, in the aggregate, the share of foreign households who actually received public assistance was marginally higher than that of natives. However, standardized comparisons e . , adjusted for social and economic characteristics which determine need and eligibility) showed that immigrants were significantly _less likely to receive welfare income than native families. The robustness of this result is impressive, for it obtained when derived from single equations in which households of all national origins were pooled, and from multiple equations in which immigrants were compared to natives of like national origin. 
Summary and Conclusion
In assessing the economic consequences of immigration, we examined statistical facts about the size of contemporary flows and critically reviewed existing evidence about labor market impacts and welfare utilization.
(1) While the volume has increased appreciably in recent decades, there is no basis for concluding that it has exceeded the growth rate or absorptive capacity of the U.S. labor force.
( 2 ) The negative impacts of immigrants on the earnings and employment of native workers are quite small, though they may be nontrivial for selected subgroups (e.g., previous immigrants) and within high-ethnic-density labor Contemplating the policy implications of these findings brings us full circle to our opening quotes and a reaffirmation that history has repeated itself. Contemporary worries about immigrants taking jobs from native workers, about their potential drain on social expenditures, and their prospects for becoming assimilated into the U.S. labor market are reminiscent of those which were pervasive at the turn of the century, and before. But, just as history is repetitive, it is instructive.
It is unlikely that any reforms--whether sweeping or superficial--will resolve the irreconcilable conflicts inherent in an immigration policy which strives to balance political, economic, social, humanitarian, and philosophical considerations. The policy dilemma does not admit simple solutions, as Abrams and Abrams note, "...
(1)f we emphasize the economic role of immigration and admit more and more skilled workers, we sacrifice the goal of reuniting families; if we stress (as is now the case) the admission of relatives, we lose control of the effect of immigration on our labor markets.
If we admit highly skilled immigrants, we may be hurting their home countries and our own less privileged citizens; if we fail to admit the highly skilled 
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